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The Case for Coca and Cocaine: Bolivia's
March to Economic Freedom
Daniel Tyler Cook*
INTRODUCTION
For centuries, the Bolivian people have engaged in an inti-
mate relationship with coca.1 Ancient Indian communities cul-
tivated and consumed coca as a part of their cultural lives.2 To-
day, at least one million Bolivians still consume coca in some
form. 3 Indeed, coca is recognized as the most indispensable of
* J.D. Candidate, 2004, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2001, Millikin
University. I dedicate this article to the late Dr. Robert C. McIntire, whose passion
for world politics was second to none. I would also like to thank Dr. Michelle Dear-
dorff and Dr. Brian Posler for making me an academic; my family, friends, and the
BBP for their unconditional support; every editor and staffer of the Journal who
made this article happen; and Josh Munderloh for thinking up a topic on which I
could speak my piece.
1. JORGE HURTADO GuMucIo, COCAINE, THE LEGEND: ABOUT COCA LEAVES
AND COCAINE 13-16 (1995); Madeline Barbara Lions & Harry Sanabria, Coca and
Cocaine in Bolivia: Reality and Policy Illusion, in COCA, COCAINE, AND THE
BOLIVIAN REALITY 1, 3-4 (Madeline Barbara Lons & Harry Sanabria eds., 1997);
JAMES PAINTER, BOLIVIA AND COCA: A STUDY IN DEPENDENCY 1 (1994); Alison L.
Spedding, The Coca Field as a Total Social Fact, in COCA, COCAINE, AND THE
BOLIVIAN REALITY, supra, at 47.
2. ROBERTO LASERNA, TWENTY (MIs)CONCEPTIONS ON COCA AND COCAINE 11-
12 (1997); PAINTER, supra note 1, at 1 (noting centuries-old Bolivian traditions of the
use of coca for medicinal, cultural, and religious purposes); Elayne Zorn, Coca, Cash,
and Cloth in Highland Bolivia: The Chapare and Transformations in a "Traditional"
Andean Textile Economy, in COCA, COCAINE, AND THE BOLIVIAN REALITY, supra note
1, at 71, 95 (noting that many coca growers believe coca is necessary for survival and
a prosperous future).
3. PAINTER, supra note 1, at 1; see also LASERNA, supra note 2, at 60-61 (cit-
ing studies finding that around ninety percent of Bolivia's rural population con-
sumed coca in some form in the mid-1970s, as well as twenty percent of the total
population).
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Bolivian crops to its citizens. 4 Coca also constitutes the raw ma-
terial for cocaine. 5 This fact ignites international concern, prin-
cipally in the United States.6 As a result of the international
drug trade, coca and its regulation has shaped, and continues to
shape, Bolivian foreign affairs and domestic policy.
7
The U.S.-led "war on drugs" has primarily targeted the coca
growing Andean Nations, including Bolivia.8 In doing so, the
United States targets the supply side of the drug trade, attempt-
ing to eradicate drug production in these source countries with
the aim of preventing consumption within U.S. borders. 9 While
drug use and abuse might justify such policies from a North
American perspective, a Bolivian perspective could hardly jus-
tify current international coca policies. Rather, such a U.S.-led
perspective exposes the inefficacy of current drug policies aimed
at Bolivia. 10
This Note attempts to provide an assessment of current
U.S.-backed drug policies from a Bolivian perspective. Part I
traces the history of coca/cocaine production, use, and legislation
in Bolivia and in the international community in order to dem-
onstrate the integral role played by the United States in Bo-
livia's coca regulatory regime. Part II examines alternatives to
current Bolivian drug policies and offers a different approach to
coca/cocaine regulation. This approach emphasizes Bolivian in-
terests over the interests of other countries, specifically the
United States, by proposing a unilateral approach to drug regu-
lation to benefit and buttress Bolivia's culture, society, and
economy. This Note concludes that Bolivia's acquiescence to a
4. Madeline Barbara L~ons, After the Boom: Income Decline, Eradication, and
Alternative Development in the Yungas, in COCA, COCAINE, AND THE BOLIVIAN
REALITY, supra note 1, at 139, 166.
5. Eduardo Gamarra, Bolivia, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON DRUG
CONTROL 102 (Scott B. MacDonald & Bruce Zagaris eds., 1992).
6. Eduardo A. Gamarra, Fighting Drugs in Bolivia: United States and Boliv-
ian Perceptions at Odds, in COCA, COCAINE, AND THE BOLIVIAN REALITY, supra note
1, at 243, 245-46; see L~ons & Sanabria, supra note 1, at 21-27; Melanie R.
Hallums, Note, Bolivia and Coca: Law, Policy, and Drug Control, 30 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 817, 818 (1997).
7. See infra notes 68-193 and accompanying text.
8. Hallums, supra note 6, at 818.
9. Id. at 819-21; see also RICHARD DAVENPORT-HINES, THE PURSUIT OF
OBLIVION: A GLOBAL HISTORY OF NARCOTICS 1500-2000, at 338-83 (2001). For ex-
ample, U.S. policy aims to keep coca profits at a level that makes the growing of al-
ternative crops a viable economic alternative. Thus, reduction of coca prices is a
goal of the war on drugs. LASERNA, supra note 2, at 81.
10. L~ons & Sanabria, supra note 1, at 3.
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self-interested U.S. drug policy not only fails to promote Bo-
livia's interests, but also causes more harm than it alleviates.
I. COCA AND COCAINE REGULATION IN BOLIVIA: A
HISTORICAL COMPENDIUM
For centuries, coca has played a prominent cultural, eco-
nomic, political, and social role in Bolivian society.11 Moreover,
as the basis of cocaine, coca has played a pivotal role in interna-
tional relations, particularly the relations between Bolivia and
the United States. 12 Coca has engendered diametric feelings of
admiration and hate, hope and dread, unity and division.
13
Where polemics reign, conflict often follows, and serenity rarely
triumphs. This is the Bolivian reality.
A. FROM COCA TO COCAINE
At the outset, it is important to recognize the mate-
rial/chemical distinctions between coca and cocaine. Simply put,
cocaine is the end product of processing coca, just as whiskey
comes from barley, or wine from grapes. 14 Cocaine results from
a three-stage process. 15 The first stage involves mixing coca
leaves with sulfuric acid, stomping the leaves, mixing the
stomped leaves with kerosene, diesel fuel, and calcium oxide,
and finally, adding sodium carbonate to yield cocaine paste. 16 In
the second stage, which is optional and done primarily to purify
the end product, the paste is washed in kerosene, dissolved in
sulfuric acid, and mixed with potassium permanganate and
ammonium hydroxide to form cocaine base.' 7 In the final stage,
involving the use of complex equipment and rare chemical in-
puts, the cocaine paste is dissolved in acetone and water,
heated, mixed with ether, and added to hydrochloric acid to pre-
11. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
12. See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text.
13. See generally DAVENPORT-HINES, supra note 9, at 119, 168-69 (noting the
history of coca/cocaine use from a variety of perspectives); infra notes 25-39, 83-199
and accompanying text (suggesting, generally, that differing views as to coca and
cocaine exist, and that such views have created various conflicts).
14. See PAINTER, supra note 1, at 25.
15. Id. at 23.
16. L~ons & Sanabria, supra note 1, at 15. Cocaine paste contains forty to fifty
percent cocaine alkaloid. Id.
17. PAINTER, supra note 1, at 23. Cocaine base contains eighty-five to ninety
percent cocaine alkaloid. L6ons & Sanabria, supra note 1, at 15.
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cipitate the cocaine crystals.18 This process yields cocaine hy-
drochloride, or more simply, cocaine. 19
As this process demonstrates, much goes into converting
coca to cocaine. Furthermore, from this process one learns that
cocaine is substantially dissimilar from coca. The two sub-
stances are neither identical in make nor similar in uses.
20
B. COCA'S ROLE IN BOLIVIAN SOCIETY
Within Bolivia, three primary areas yield most of its coca:
the Yungas in La Paz, the Chapare in Cochabamba, and the Ya-
pacani in Santa Cruz. 21 These areas consist mainly of rural
farmers living in extreme poverty who grow coca because of a
lack of other economic opportunities. 22 When confronted by
anti-drug advocates that link, however accurately, coca with co-
caine, these farmers defend their right to grow coca on two
grounds: (1) coca's sacredness to their ancestors, and (2) coca's
role in their ability to earn a living.23 While cocaine is derived
from coca, the two have very different histories within Bolivian
society.
For centuries coca, a non-addictive stimulant, 24 has played
an important and essential role in Bolivian life. 25 This is espe-
cially true for the poor who grow coca on family farms; it is these
18. L6ons & Sanabria, supra note 1, at 16.
19. Id.
20. PAINTER, supra note 1, at 25; LASERNA, supra note 2, at 28 (reporting that
coca chewing produces a "tropine 80 times less toxic than cocaine.").
21. Hallums, supra note 6, at 826. The Chapare region surpassed the Yungas
region as the main coca-growing region in Bolivia in the 1960s. For example, in
1985, it produced between ninety to ninety-five percent of Bolivia's coca. HARRY
SANABRIA, THE COCA BOOM AND RURAL SOCIAL CHANGE IN BOLIVIA 41 (1993). How-
ever, as recent eradication efforts have focused extensively on the Chapare region,
the dominance of this region has been called into question. See Kevin G. Hall, U.S.
Faces Opposition to Anti-Drug Campaign from Bolivian Legislator, KNIGHT
RIDDER/TRIB. NEWS SERV., July 2, 2002, available at LEXIS, News Library, Knight
Ridder/Tribune News Service File (noting that most of the recently eradicated coca
was grown in the Chapare region).
22. Hallums, supra note 6, at 825-26. The people of these regions previously
mined tin and silver; however, around 1985, the price of tin plummeted, leaving
many peasants without work. Id. at 826 n. 1. They turned to coca for their liveli-
hood. Id. at 826.
23. Id. at 827.
24. GUMUCIO, supra note 1, at 24. "The desire to chew coca can be abandoned
indefinitely, without suffering physical or psychological effects, or the appearance of
compulsive behavior to alleviate the desire." Id.
25. See Spedding, supra note 1, at 69 ("The coca field can ... be seen as a social
nexus that unites . . . diverse elements and activities: it is a total social fact.").
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people, and not wealthy drug lords, who rely most heavily on
coca production. 26 Those who consume coca typically suck the
leaves through a process called "acullico,"27 but one might also
consume coca in teas and medicinal preparations. 28 Its benefi-
cial uses abound: the coca leaf contains vitamins and minerals
to assist in nutritional needs; relieves hunger, thirst, pain, and
fatigue; and helps alleviate high-altitude stressors such as cold
and low oxygen levels. 29 Coca is also used for religious and cul-
tural rituals. 30 For instance, Bolivians exchange gifts of coca as
part of marriage rituals and to solidify other social obligations. 31
Coca also serves as "an index of cultural identity, and serves as
a medium of communication between humans and supernatural
beings."32 In many parts of the Andean region, coca is, and has
been for some time, currency. 33 Employers exchange coca for
services, and in many fields, coca is necessary to mobilize la-
bor.34 As such, coca is an integral component of Bolivian culture
and serves an important economic role, even when divorced
from the cocaine trade.35
Coca's role in the Bolivian economy is critical. In the early
1990s, before heavy eradication efforts took effect,36 there were
around 60,000 Bolivian farmers growing coca, and thousands
more citizens involved in its picking, selling, transporting, proc-
essing and distribution.3 7 These people have suffered greatly
from eradication efforts that limit, and in some instances ban,
coca production. 38 As Bolivia's citizens suffer, so does the coun-
26. L~ons & Sanabria, supra note 1, at 8-9.
27. LASERNA, supra note 2, at 21 (describing the process of acullico as placing
coca leaves between the cheek and gum, wetting the leaves in the mouth with a mix-
ture of saliva and high carbon ash lye, and sucking, rather than chewing, on the
substance for up to four hours); GUMUCIO, supra note 1, at 23.
28. LASERNA, supra note 2, at 60.
29. SANABRIA, supra note 21, at 38 (noting that coca's medicinal uses range
from coca tea to coca ointment to bathing solutions as folk remedies); Melanie
Takefman, Bolivia Stands Strong Against Economic Globalization, ALTERNATIVES,
Feb. 2, 2003, at http://dev.alternatives.ca/article303.html; PAINTER, supra note 1, at
25; LASERNA, supra note 2, at 22, 24, 27; GUMUCIO, supra note 1, at 23, 26, 28, 30.
30. SANABRIA, supra note 21, at 38; GUMUCIO, supra note 1, at 17-19.
31. SANABRIA, supra note 21, at 38.
32. Id.; PAINTER, supra note 1, at 1; GUMUCIO, supra note 1, at 14, 19 (noting
that Bolivia's ancestors used coca to forecast coming events, to cure natural ailments
and disasters, and to communicate with supernatural forces).
33. SANABRIA, supra note 21, at 38.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See infra notes 116-26 and accompanying text.
37. PAINTER, supra note 1, at 40.
38. L6ons, supra note 4, at 146.
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try's economy. According to one source, the virtual eradication
of coca from the Chapare region has cost Bolivia's national econ-
omy an estimated $500 million.39
Much of coca's economic success comes from the fact that
coca thrives under Bolivia's ecological conditions. 40 To grow
coca, a region must ideally be at an altitude between one thou-
sand and fifty-nine hundred feet above sea level, have a mean
annual temperature between sixty-four and seventy-eight de-
grees Fahrenheit, and have an average annual precipitation of
about four inches. 41 Bolivia, and particularly the Chapare re-
gion, provides such favorable conditions.
42
A comparison with other crops, namely coffee, passion fruit,
and rice, demonstrates coca's superiority in Bolivia. 43 The coca
plant tolerates Bolivia's extreme temperature fluctuations,
while other crops are incapable of survival.44 Furthermore, coca
grown in the Chapare region yields from four to six harvests a
year compared to two or three harvests from other cash crops.
4 5
Because it is easily stored, transported, and sold in markets,
coca is the most stable and reliable cash crop in Bolivia.46 Coca
is also less susceptible than coffee and rice to disease and in-
sects 47 and does not require nearly as much land to grow effec-
tively compared to other crops.
48
Moreover, coca yields a higher profit than all other alterna-
tive crops. 49 According to one source, coca production yields
about $475 an acre annually, compared to $35 to $250 a year for
bananas and grapefruit. 50 In essence, coca production thrives
39. George Ann Potter & Linda Farthing, Eradicating Democracy, IN FOCUS
POLVY BRIEFS (Foreign Policy in Focus/Interhemispheric Resources Ctr., Silver City,
N.M.), Oct. 2000, at http://www.fpif.org/pdf/vol5/38ifbolivia.pdf.
40. See SANABRIA, supra note 21, at 44.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. L6ons, supra note 4, at 159, 162.
44. SANABRIA, supra note 21, at 44.
45. Id.
46. LASERNA, supra note 2, at 86.
47. SANABRIA, supra note 21, at 44.
48. LASERNA, supra note 2, at 72.
49. Id. at 71, 121 (noting that coca is Bolivia's "cash" crop, and noting that ar-
eas with coca plantings yield profits four times higher than those without coca plant-
ings).
50. Hallums, supra note 6, at 822 (citing Mathea Falco, U.S. Drug Policy: Ad-
dicted to Failure, FOREIGN POLY, Mar. 22, 1996, at 120, 124); see also Ldons, supra
note 4, at 159 (noting that "coffee is simply not as profitable as coca," as it takes
twice as much land in coffee to give an equal return to coca); SANABRIA, supra note
21, at 46 (comparing the price of a sack of coca against a sack of potatoes from 1983
[Vo1.13:1
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because of the economic futility of other major cash crops.5 1
Without coca production, Bolivia's poverty-stricken farmers
would fall far deeper into debt.52 Income from coca exports also
plays a significant role in subsidizing services and imported
goods, replacing absent export revenues from other commodi-
ties, offsetting the financial drain of international debt service,
and stabilizing the political order. 53
C. COCAINE'S ROLE IN BOLIVIAN SOCIETY
In contrast to coca, cocaine has no lengthy history as a
hallmark of Bolivian society.5 4 There is nothing to suggest that
Bolivians built their traditions around cocaine consumption or
production. Even today, cocaine use is less common than the
use of other drugs. 55 Indeed, although Bolivia has exported co-
caine for some time now, it was the increase of demand in the
United States and, to a lesser extent, in Europe that led to a
boom in production within Bolivian borders.
56
Domestically, cocaine usage affects a small percentage of
the Bolivian population.5 7 Most Bolivian government officials
concede that cocaine trafficking is not a serious national secu-
rity threat and that drug lords do not threaten Bolivian institu-
tions.58 Bolivian traffickers, unlike those in Colombia, are gen-
erally peaceful, thus posing little threat to the citizenry.59 Some
to 1985, revealing that coca yielded anywhere from $318 to $80 more profit than po-
tatoes); Takefman, supra note 29 ("[C]oca is twice as profitable as pineapples and up
to five times as profitable as macadamia nuts .. "). But see PAINTER, supra note 1,
at 20 (indicating that both rubber and macadamia nuts yield a higher net income
per hectare than coca).
51. Kevin G. Hall & Cassio Furtado, Andean Coca Production Nears All-Time
High Despite Billions in U.S. Eradication, KNIGHT RIDDER/TRIB. NEWS SERV., July
21, 2002, available at LEXIS, News Library, Knight Ridder/Tribune News Service
File ("[T]he main incentive spurring coca production is the sorry state of prices for
coffee, the most popular substitute crop."). A twenty-five pound sack of coca garners
a market price almost four times higher than that of coffee. Id.
52. See LASERNA, supra note 2, at 71, 85 (noting that coca provides from forty
to eighty percent of farmers' income).
53. L6ons & Sanabria, supra note 1, at 3.
54. Hallums, supra note 6, at 822.
55. Id.; LASERNA, supra note 2, at 35, 37-42, 54 (citing studies indicating that
Bolivians use alcohol and other drugs more often than they use cocaine).
56. Gamarra, supra note 5, at 101.
57. Id. at 117.
58. Eduardo A. Gamarra, supra note 6, at 243-44.
59. L~ons & Sanabria, supra note 1, at 11. But see Lons, supra note 4, at 144
(describing past illegal activities such as arms proliferation, elevated violence, and
robberies that once accompanied the cocaine economy in the Yungas, the traditional
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evidence even suggests that cocaine use is declining in certain
areas of Bolivia. 60 Nevertheless, rather than focus resources
elsewhere, the United States continues to target, denounce, and
discourage cocaine production, trafficking, and consumption in
Bolivia.
6 '
Such policies are especially troublesome in light of figures
linking employment and economic success with the coca/cocaine
industry. 62 A pair of studies reports that, in the late 1980s, the
value generated by the coca/cocaine economy in Bolivia reached
$1.4 to $1.5 billion,6 3 representing three to four times the value
of legal exports.64 Another source estimates that cocaine traf-
ficking brought an estimated $356 million into the Bolivian
economy in 1994.65 In the early 1990s, it was roughly estimated
that over 120,000 to a maximum of 500,000 Bolivians worked
within the coca/cocaine industry.66 Indeed, one researcher has
posited that the cocaine trade creates new opportunities and
channels for social mobility for the poor, and promotes social dif-
ferentiation.6 7 With such potential, prohibitive regulation can
adversely affect the Bolivian economy.
D. DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL COCA/COCAINE REGULATION
IN BOLIVIA
Due to Bolivia's economic dependence on the coca/cocaine
industry for export earnings and employment, government offi-
cials have historically shied away from any aggressive crack-
down on the drug trade.6 8 Most major departures from this
strategy originated from international, rather than domestic,
coca growing zone of Bolivia).
60. See generally L~ons, supra note 4 (noting anecdotal evidence that cocaine
use is on the decline in the Yungas region).
61. See Gamarra, supra note 6, at 244-45.
62. L~ons & Sanabria, supra note 1, at 18-19.
63. Id. at 19.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 20. Note that such numbers are difficult to gauge given the illegality
of the illicit drug trade; because the trade cannot be documented officially, the dis-
crepancies in numbers are inevitable. PAINTER, supra note 1, at 36.
66. PAINTER, supra note 1, at 40.
67. L ons & Sanabria, supra note 1, at 11.
68. PAINTER, supra note 1, at 77. Without employment created by the drug
trade, Bolivia's economic situation, both past and present, would be arguably much
worse. See L~ons & Sanabria, supra note 1, at 14 (stating that employment in the
drug trade was one of the most critical factors cushioning the effect of economic con-
traction).
[Vol. 13:1
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pressure. 69 In this respect, the international drug trade regime
is important in understanding coca regulation in Bolivia.
1. Coca/Cocaine Regulation's Incipience
Chemists and physicians did not isolate cocaine from coca
leaves until the 1860s.70 In 1884, Sigmund Freud began pro-
moting cocaine as a cure for morphine addiction. 71 As a result,
cocaine production increased dramatically.72 "Cocaine rapidly
became one of the most important pharmaceutical products in
Europe and the USA." 73 Yet, by 1893, American attitudes began
to label cocaine use a vice. 74 Restrictive U.S. legislation soon fol-
lowed, which had "worldwide ramifications."
75
Concomitantly, the movement toward international drug
regulation began around the turn of the twentieth century.
76
Factors that instigated the movement toward regulation in-
cluded: (1) China's opium problem; 77 (2) medical research explor-
ing the possible harmful effects of drug use;78 (3) technological
advances developing new drugs at low costs; 79 (4) social reform
movements;8 0 and (5) U.S. annexation of the Philippines and its
corresponding opium problems. 8' Nevertheless, with the begin-
ning of World War I in 1914, the international drug trade and
its regulation evanesced to the background of world affairs.
8 2
69. PAINTER, supra note 1, at 77.
70. DAVENPORT-HINES, supra note 9, at 7.
71. Id. at 111, 113-14.
72. Id. at 117. In 1883, production was at .4 kilograms, but by 1884, produc-
tion rose to 1673 kilograms. Id.
73. Id. at 118.
74. Id. at 123.
75. DAVENPORT-HINES, supra note 9, at 151.
76. WILLIAM B. MCALLISTER, DRUG DIPLOMACY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY:
AN INTERNATIONAL HISTORY 24 (2000); W.W. WILLOUGHBY, OPIUM AS AN
INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM: THE GENEVA CONFERENCES 14 (1925).
77. DAVENPORT-HINES, supra note 9, at 159; MCALLISTER, supra note 76, at 14.
78. DAVENPORT-HINES, supra note 9, at 14. At that time, the medical commu-
nity had just begun its involvement in the testing and regulation of controlled sub-
stances. Id. Before this, the medicinal purposes of controlled substances were
rarely questioned or explored. Id.
79. MCALLISTER, supra note 76, at 16-17. With lower costs came more public
exposure and thus more public scrutiny by various governmental actors. Id.
80. DAVENPORT-HINES, supra note 9, at 14-21. At this time, religious temper-
ance movements developed, questioning the propriety of drug usage. Id.
81. DAVENPORT-HINES, supra note 9, at 154; MCALLISTER, supra note 76, at 27;
PAUL B. STARES, GLOBAL HABIT: THE DRUG PROBLEM IN A BORDERLESS WORLD 17
(1996).
82. WILLOUGHBY, supra note 76, at 35.
2004]
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When drug talks were reinitiated after World War I, Bolivia
held an anti-regulation stance in an effort to protect its coca in-
dustry.8 3 At the Second Geneva Opium Conference in 1925, Bo-
livia unsuccessfully objected to proposed measures restricting
trade in coca leaves and processed drugs such as cocaine.8 4
Nevertheless, under international pressure,8 5 Bolivia passed
four laws from 1928 to 1931 aimed at regulating the trade in
opium, morphine, marijuana, and cocaine; however, this legisla-
tion said nothing of limiting coca production or consumption.
8 6
In 1931, fifty-seven nations, including Bolivia, convened
and drafted a treaty on limiting the manufacturing and regulat-
ing the distribution of narcotic drugs.87 However, as the United
States moved to the lead of the international drug regime,88 Bo-
livia and most of its Latin American counterparts did practically
nothing to implement the treaty.8 9 In Bolivia, the economy's
dependence on coca limited the government's ability to enforce
controls on its production or distribution.90 More importantly,
the Bolivian people's dependence on the coca crop for subsis-
tence, medicinal, and religious purposes limited the govern-
ment's ability to prohibit its cultivation.91
83. WILLIAM 0. WALKER, DRUG CONTROL IN THE AMERICAS 48 (1981).
84. Id. at 50; see also WILLOUGHBY, supra note 76, at 536-39. Bolivia chose not
to sign this convention until 1928. WALKER, supra note 83, at 60; WILLOUGHBY, sU-
pra note 76, at 555. Loopholes apparent in import/export controls with regard to
such non-signatories limited the agreement's effectiveness. MCALLISTER, supra note
76, at 77. Moreover, the convention's failure to criminalize the drug traffic and to
place limitations on agricultural production and consumption gave signatories much
leeway in ignoring any significant obligations. STARES, supra note 81, at 18.
85. WALKER, supra note 83, at 48. This pressure came from a U.S. delegation
intent on imposing improved coca controls throughout the world. Id. The United
States used both its military and economic supremacy to convince the Latin Ameri-
can countries to follow its lead. Id.
86. Id. at 58.
87. MCALLISTER, supra note 76, at 95; ANDRE McNICOLL, DRUG-TRAFFICKING:
A NORTH SOUTH PERSPECTIVE 90 (1983). Under the treaty, signatories were re-
quired to submit estimates for manufactured drugs by August of the following year.
MCALLISTER, supra note 76, at 96. Once a country had reached its annual estimate,
the treaty required it to cease importation and/or manufacturing of the drug. Id.;
DAVENPORT-HINES, supra note 77, at 207.
88. MCALLISTER, supra note 76, at 108. The United States began to confront
those nations that ignored or disobeyed international agreements, and often made
public statements embarrassing those nations on a global level. Id. The United
States also began to work more closely with League of Nations entities on the sup-
pression of drug trafficking and the limitation of agricultural production. Id. at 109.
89. WALKER, supra note 83, at 83-92. Only two nations, Mexico and Uruguay,
even attempted to address concerns over the illicit traffic in drugs. Id. at 81-83.
90. Id. at 93.
91. Cf. Spedding, supra note 1, at 48 ("The integration of coca with the local
[Vol. 13:1
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Because of these economic, social and cultural reasons, most
Latin American states rejected domestic controls on the illicit
drug trade. 92 Instead, "official inattention and incompetence,
even corruption, defined the spectrum of [Latin American coun-
tries'] responses to drug problems."
93
2. An International Drug Regime Forms Despite Bolivian
Resistance
In 1953, countries from around the globe convened to draft
yet another treaty, this time to limit agricultural opium produc-
tion, and to enact reporting requirements. 94 Although a Protocol
was drafted, it contained numerous deficiencies. 95 The Latin
American nations ultimately ignored it, and the protocol was
never ratified. 96 For the time being, control advocates thought it
best to let Latin America rest with regard to international drug
regulation.97 The failed opium Protocol, however, spurred the
opium and coca powers into action.98 Clearly, Latin American
nations saw the treaty as a potential threat to their own interest
if its stipulations were extended to other drugs in the next
round of international negotiations. 99
ecology and social structure of the peasant family and community.., is one of the
factors that makes it almost impossible to eradicate coca without also eradicating, or
expelling, the entire population [of the Yungas region]."). Although Spedding's ob-
servations are based upon fieldwork conducted between 1986 and 1995, the cultiva-
tion of coca is a centuries-old tradition in the Yungas. Id. at 48-51.
92. MCALLISTER, supra note 76, at 119.
93. WALKER, supra note 83, at 83.
94. MCALLISTER, supra note 76, at 179. The agreement, known as the Opium
Protocol, "contained the most stringent drug-control provisions yet embodied in in-
ternational law." Id. at 181. It extended to raw opium the reporting procedures al-
ready applicable to manufactured drugs. Id. From henceforth, nations were re-
quired to submit to the Drug Supervisory Body estimates of the amount of opium
planted, harvested, consumed domestically, exported, and stockpiled. Id. The treaty
granted an international regulating agency the power to make inquiries into any
discrepancies, conduct inspections, and impose embargoes on signatories and non-
signatories alike. Id. It placed heavy emphasis on reducing cultivation and supply.
DAVENPORT-HINES, supra note 77, at 207.
95. McALLISTER, supra note 76, at 179. On-site inspections could only be car-
ried out with the approval of the target country. Id. The provisions allowed for the
appeal of embargoes, and did not require military stocks to be reported. Id. Fur-
thermore, the treaty was silent with respect to domestic consumption, and an escape
clause allowed countries to disregard the treaty in cases of emergency. Id.
96. Id. at 202-03.
97. See id.
98. Id. at 182.
99. Id. at 181-82.
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This next round of negotiations came eight years later
and resulted in the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic
Drugs. 100 Its inception came about despite a Latin American
veto coalition formed to preclude excessive international regula-
tions.10 1 Bolivia ratified the treaty in 1961, and in 1962 passed
a decree calling for a census of coca cultivation and prohibiting
the planting of new coca fields.10 2 Provisions were made to in-
troduce new crops as substitutes for coca throughout Bolivia.
103
However, coca growers, recognizing the threat to their liveli-
hoods, objected to these measures, and while coffee was intro-
duced as a substitute cash crop, it's planting expanded only to
areas undesirable for coca. 10 4 Thus, as applied to Bolivia, the
treaty did little to reduce coca cultivation and production.
In 1973, legislation passed in Bolivia requiring registration
and licensing of all coca cultivators.1 0 5 Yet, as with the 1962 de-
cree, coca growers ignored the provisions and they were rarely
enforced.106 In conjunction with Bolivian domestic legislation,
the United States and Bolivia entered into bilateral agreements
that provided funds to Bolivia for the Chapare-Yungas Devel-
opment Project (PRODES), a development project aimed at
promoting coca crop substitution with financial and technical
assistance from the United States Agency for International De-
velopment (USAID).10
7
100. MCNICOLL, supra note 87, at 90. See also MCALLISTER, supra note 76, at
207. Under its fifty-one articles, the treaty "effected a significant simplification of
the control regime." Id. Article four stated the general obligation "to limit exclu-
sively to medical and scientific purposes the production, manufacture, export, im-
port, distribution of, trade in, use, and possession of drugs." Id. Thus, the new
treaty retained previous agreements' statistical reporting requirements on imports,
exports, and stocks, and retained the import/export certification system in place
since 1912. Id. For the first time producer states would have to report statistics di-
rectly to the INCB. Id. The treaty also required governments to license manufac-
turers, traders, and distributors, and required all drug handlers to maintain records
of their transactions. Id. The treaty, in Articles 26 and 27, placed less exacting re-
quirements on coca-producing states. Id. Furthermore, while Article 28 dealt with
the control of cannabis, it avoided placing serious restrictions on its consumption,
distribution, or production. Id.
101. MCALLISTER, supra note 76, at 207.
102. L6ons & Sanabria, supra note 1, at 21.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 22.
105. Id.
106. This legislation also called for crop substitution; this requirement continues
to be unrealized. Id.
107. L6ons & Sanabria, supra note 1, at 21 (noting that Bolivia received some
$11 million from the U.S. Government for this project in the 1970s). According to
USAID's website, its twofold purpose is to further "America's foreign policy interests
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In 1981, Bolivia passed legislation recognizing that the cul-
tivation of specific substitute crops as part of an overall devel-
opment program, while not as profitable as coca, had other ad-
vantages that would approximate coca's profits in the long
run. 108 Those advantages centered on increased employment
from the cultivation of these crops, as well as increased em-
ployment in public works and infrastructure programs needed
to support the nascent development program.10 9
As a result of Bolivia's lackluster efforts to regulate cocaine
production, unilateral action by the United States in the mid-
1980s helped to ensure Bolivia's acquiescence in fighting Amer-
ica's drug war.11 0 In 1986, the United States passed the Foreign
Assistance Act,1 1 which provided for the suspension of economic
aid to countries unwilling to assist the United States in its drug
efforts.1 1 2 In declaring drug control a top priority, this Act cre-
ated a certification system which remains the key enforcement
tool in the Andean region.113 Under this system, the United
States uses economic foreign aid to encourage foreign govern-
ments to enact domestic drug control measures by only "certify-
ing" those countries taking sufficient steps to eradicate crops
such as coca. 1' 4 If a country is "decertified," the United States
ceases aid and opposes World Bank and other development
loans to that country.
1' 5
To reinforce its objectives, two years later in 1988 the
United States enacted the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, which called for
increased multilateral and regional involvement in controlling
the international drug trade.1' 6 The Act set forth a certification
system that placed crop eradication at the forefront of the U.S.-
in expanding democracy and free markets while improving the lives of the citizens of
the developing world." USAID, About USAID, at http://www.usaid.gov/aboutusaidl
(last visited Nov. 9, 2003).
108. Ldons & Sanabria, supra note 1, at 22.
109. Id. President Paz Zamora's policy of "coca for development" in the 1980s is
an example of this policy, as it focused not only on agricultural substitution, but also
public works and infrastructure programs to employ former coca growers. Id.
110. See infra notes 111-117 and accompanying text.
111. 22 U.S.C. § 2291 (1988) (as amended by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 2005, 100 Stat. 3207-61 to 62 (1986)).
112. Id.
113. Hallums, supra note 6, at 844.
114. Sandi R. Murphy, Note, Drug Diplomacy and the Supply-Side Strategy: A
Survey of United States Practice, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1262 (1990).
115. Mathea Falco, Passing Grades: Branding Nations Won't Resolve the U.S.
Drug Problem, FOREIGN AFF., Sept. 19, 1995, at 18.
116. Murphy, supra note 114, at 1264.
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Bolivian drug policy. 117 With the looming threat of losing eco-
nomic aid, Bolivia subsequently undertook an eradication strat-
egy and today has eliminated a good deal of its coca crops. 118
In 1987, the United States and Bolivia entered into the
Narcotic Drugs Agreement to reinforce Bolivian cooperation in
the elimination of coca production. 119 Under the treaty, the
United States loaned Bolivia aircraft and operational, financial,
and technical support to implement coca eradication pro-
grams. 120 Under the "Three-Year Plan," four subprograms were
developed to address and attack Bolivia's coca industry: (1) agri-
cultural transition; 121 (2) economic reactivation; 122 (3) regional
development; 123 and (4) narcotics awareness and rehabilita-
tion. 24 The treaty was amended in 1990 to focus on promoting
alternative development, eliminating cocaine production, reduc-
ing coca cultivation, and eliminating facilities used to make co-
caine. 25 As part of this effort, the treaty expanded Bolivian
Armed Forces participation in the anti-drug program.126
In 1988, international efforts resumed, this time in Vienna,
to address the international drug trade, 127 with the resultant
ratification of the Convention Against Illegal Trade in Narcotics
and Controlled Substances. 128 Although the Convention called
117. Id. at 1265.
118. Id. at 1268.
119. Agreement on Narcotic Drugs, Feb. 24, 1987, U.S.-Bolivia, T.I.A.S. No.
12053 [hereinafter Narcotic Drugs Agreement].
120. Id. at 8-9.
121. Narcotic Drugs Agreement Annex II, supra note 119, at 23-24. Agricultural
transition is a form of economic assistance; rather than sending money to the Boliv-
ian government, economic assistance goes to farmers who voluntarily eradicate coca
and who agree to participate in legal income-generating activities. Hallums, supra
note 6, at 848.
122. Narcotic Drugs Agreement Annex II, supra note 119, at 23-24. With eco-
nomic reactivation, coca farmers are given credit resources to expand legal agricul-
tural productivity so that their income does not suffer from coca eradication.
Hallums, supra note 6, at 848.
123. Narcotic Drugs Agreement Annex II, supra note 119, at 23-24. Regional
development focuses on improving infrastructures of those regions affected by the
Plan. Hallums, supra note 6, at 848.
124. Narcotic Drugs Agreement Annex II, supra note 119, at 23-24. Narcotics
awareness and rehabilitation provides assistance and resources to projects that
promote narcotics awareness. Hallums, supra note 6, at 848.
125. Agreement Concerning Cooperation to Combat Narcotics Trafficking, May
9, 1990, U.S-Bolivia, Hein's No. KAV 2505, Temp. State Dep't No. 90-161 [hereinaf-
ter Supplemental Agreement].
126. Id.
127. L~ons & Sanabria, supra note 1, at 22.
128. Id.
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for the eradication of coca, because of Bolivian influence, it also
urged integrated rural development and economically viable al-
ternatives for coca growers. 129 While Bolivia ultimately signed
the agreement, it noted its reservations, maintaining that coca
by itself is not a narcotic and has no harmful psychological or
physical effects when used traditionally. 130 Again, as on previ-
ous occasions, Bolivia agreed to coca/cocaine regulations while
maintaining a positive position on coca production in general.
3. The Passage of Ley 1008
In 1988, Bolivia passed what has become notorious legisla-
tion known as Ley 1008.131 Ley 1008 was enacted in response to
U.S. pressure to prohibit coca production.1 32 In fact, USAID
helped to write the legislation. 133 Ley 1008 requires gradual
eradication of coca through both voluntary and forced removal
techniques.1 34 Moreover, the law requires international devel-
opment assistance to ensure effective coca eradication." 135 Ley
1008 also establishes strict criminal processes for prosecuting
drug traffickers, users, and producers. 136
Nevertheless, and despite U.S. influence, Ley 1008 formally
recognizes the licit uses of coca. It allows for coca cultivation so
long as it is for agricultural, social/cultural, medicinal, or reli-
gious/ritualistic use. 137 It bans coca cultivated to produce co-
caine.1 38 It also distinguishes between coca in its natural state
and chemically processed cocaine.13 9
129. Id.
130. Id. By 1997, only two Latin American countries, Bolivia and Peru, had
signed the treaty, and these countries did so primarily because of heightened criti-
cism from the United States. Hallums, supra note 6, at 841.
131. Ley del Regimen de la Coca y Sustancias Controladas: Ley 1008 (1988)
[hereinafter Ley 1008].
132. L~ons & Sanabria, supra note 1, at 22; Hallums, supra note 6, at 830.
133. Hallums, supra note 6, at 830. L6ons & Sanabria, supra note 1, at 24
(highlighting figures showing that USAID receives much aid to assist in Bolivia's
eradication efforts); see also supra note 107 and accompanying text.
134. Hallums, supra note 6, at 831.
135. See id. International development assistance refers to foreign aid.
136. Ley 1008, supra note 131, tits. III, IV, V. For instance, anyone accused un-
der the law remains in jail for the length of the judicial proceedings. Hallums, supra
note 6, at 832. A typical case takes three to four years before final adjudication. Id.
at 832 n.84. Moreover, mandatory sentencing provisions exist, which has led to
overcrowding in Bolivia's prisons of drug offenders, most of whom are impecunious.
137. Id. art. 2.
138. Id.
139. Id. art. 3.
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Despite these concessions, Ley 1008 still sparked heated
debate within Bolivia. 140 The Bolivian government's position on
the law has been ill-defined. 141 From July 1993 to October 1994,
the government proposed twenty different positions on coca con-
trol. 142 Indeed, until ten years after its passage, much of the
law had not been implemented fully because of internal political
pressure on the Bolivian government. 143 In fact, many Bolivians
feel as if Ley 1008, as a product of international compulsion,
threatens national sovereignty in addition to their cultural and
historical traditions related to coca. 14 4 Most Bolivians do not
support the law and its focus on large-scale reduction. 145 It is
known throughout Bolivia as the "Law of Foreigners."'146 Ac-
cording to one scholar, "the anti-drug strategy of which Ley
1008 is a part, has undermined the country's sovereignty, led to
human rights abuses and penalized the poor majority, who in
the face of one of the century's worst economic crises are en-
gaged in an often desperate struggle for survival."
147
4. Post-Ley 1008 Legislation
The following year, in 1989, the United States announced
its Andean Strategy, a five-year plan under which the United
States would give $2.5 billion to Bolivia, Peru, and Columbia for
drug eradication efforts. 148 This policy, similar to previous ef-
forts, focused on three main areas: (1) law enforcement, (2) crop
eradication, and (3) economic assistance.
149
On a regional level, in 1990, the first Andean drug summit
meeting assembled in Colombia, as the Presidents of Bolivia,
140. Hallums, supra note 6, at 833.
141. Id.
142. Id. Such positions ranged from "continued eradication of 'excess' coca leaf,
voluntary eradication, alternative crop development, and 'opcion 0,' or total eradica-
tion of all coca in the main growing region within six years," to international legali-
zation of coca cultivation, the last position being rejected by the international com-
munity. Id. at 833-34.
143. Id. (noting that the law is not enforced because a national consensus on the
evils of coca cultivation is lacking).
144. Hallums, supra note 6, at 833-34.
145. Id. at 835; Hall & Furtado, supra note 51.
146. Hallums, supra note 6, at 835.
147. Linda Farthing, Social Impacts Associated with Antidrug Law 1008, in
COCA, COCAINE, AND THE BOLIVIAN REALITY, supra note 1, at 269.
148. CLARE HARGREAVES, SNOWFIELDs: THE WAR ON COCAINE IN THE ANDES 18
(1992). Under this plan, nearly seventy percent of the U.S. drug control budget went
to international supply reduction efforts. Id.
149. Id.
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Peru, Columbia, and the United States pledged to cooperate in a
joint attack against the drug trade. 150 The United States agreed
to finance programs for alternative development, crop substitu-
tion, and economic revitalization with the hope of reducing the
amount of coca and increasing public awareness of drug control
issues. 151 The Bolivian government, dependent on foreign aid
from the United States, acquiesced to the agreement despite ex-
plicit recognition of such policies' failures. 152 For instance, for-
mer Bolivian president Sanchez de Lozada called alternative
development "a great disaster" for the Bolivian people. 15 3 Yet,
in practice, very few Bolivian policymakers seriously encourage
the expansion of such food crops as corn, wheat, or potatoes, as
"cheap food" policies keep prices so low that an individual could
not benefit from such yields. 15 4 Furthermore, crop substitution
only extends to those crops that would not compete with U.S.
produced crops in the international market.1 55
In 1994, leaders from the western hemisphere convened at
the Summit of Americas to address concerns and agreed to com-
bat illicit drug trafficking by reducing drug production and
use.156 The countries agreed to new enforcement methods to
disrupt drug trafficking, including increasing prosecution of
those active in the drug trade. 5
7
5. Plan Dignidad and the Present Bolivian Reality
In 1998, Bolivia put in motion Plan Dignidad, an anti-drug
strategy designed to eradicate cocaine production throughout
150. Raphael F. Perl, U.S.-Andean Drug Policy, in DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE
AMERICAS 26 (Bruce M. Bagley & William 0. Walker III eds., 1994).
151. Id.
152. L6ons & Sanabria, supra note 1, at 26, 48 (noting that those who accept
payments to eradicate often learn that the monetary award is not enough to support
a family for a sufficient amount of time and such stories discouraged others from
eradicating their crops for payments).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 25; Spedding, supra note 1, at 52 (calling alternative development
strategies "failures").
155. L6ons & Sanabria, supra note 1, at 25 (noting that powerful interests rep-
resenting large-scale U.S. soybean and citrus growers successfully lobbied against
legislation that would have awarded technical and credit assistance to Bolivian
farmers to grow soybeans and citrus fruits, despite expert reports that such products
have an excellent chance of competing in the international market).
156. Summit of the Americas: Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action, Dec.
11, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 808 (1995) [hereinafter Summit of the Americas].
157. Id. at 819.
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the country. 158 Under this plan, the Bolivian government, with
U.S. assistance, 159 has focused on coca eradication and crop al-
ternatives simultaneously to fight America's drug war while at-
tempting to maintain some economic success. 160 The "success"
of this strategy in eradicating coca has been striking. 16 1 How-
ever, its results, motivated and encouraged by U.S. policies,
have recently led to massive resistance.
162
Coca growers participate in both national and international
conferences of coca cultivators, and have managed to bring coca
issues to center stage in Bolivian politics. 16 3 This is demon-
strated by the Bolivian national elections held in June 2002.164
The near-victory of Evo Morales, 165 the socialist leader of the
coca workers' union signals that Bolivians have finally decided
to confront the U.S.-backed drug policy.
66
This is also apparent based on the recent plantings of coca
fields throughout the Chapare region. 167 More strikingly, pro-
158. See generally Takefman, supra note 29 (noting how the U.S. and Bolivian
governments have introduced alternative crops to the coca-rich Chapare region).
159. Id. For instance, in 2002, the United States allocated $29 million to Bolivia
to assist in alternative crop production, infrastructure projects, and academic schol-
arships. Id. Not surprisingly, this money is contingent on successful eradication
efforts. Id.
160. See id.
161. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE'S
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT (INCSR): BOLIVIA, avail-
able at http://bolivia.usembassy.gov/english/CertificacionBoliviaeng2002.htm (2002)
(claiming that by 2001 Bolivia had reduced its cultivation of "illicit coca" by more
than seventy percent since 1996, from 48,100 hectares to an estimated 19,900 hec-
tares); Hall & Furtado, supra note 51 (noting that by 2001 Bolivia had nearly ended
coca growing for illegal purposes); A Hardline on Coca Meets Bloodshed, ECONOMIST,
Sept. 14, 2002 (stating that coca production was down to 6,000 hectares in 2001).
162. See A Hardline on Coca Meets Bloodshed, supra note 155 (noting coca farm-
ers' recent and repeated blockades of roads and towns).
163. L~ons & Sanabria, supra note 1, at 28-29.
164. See Hall & Furtado, supra note 51.
165. See id. (noting that Morales campaigned in favor of growing coca and shut-
ting down United States Drug Enforcement Administration operations).
166. The New President Faces a Weak Economy and a Combustible Polity,
ECONOMIST, Sept. 14, 2002; Takefman, supra note 29 (noting that 'Morales's success
was a blow to U.S. hegemony," and explaining that Morales' anti-U.S. stance did
much to win votes).
167. L6ons & Sanabria, supra note 1, at 17 (noting that such plantings are con-
sidered a "continuing phenomenon"). For instance, despite eradication efforts in the
mid-1990s, U.S. accounts document slight increases in coca cultivation during that
period. Id. LASERNA, supra note 2, at 87 (stating the U.S. war on drugs has not dis-
couraged coca production in any significant respect); see also Alison L. Spedding, Co-
cataki, Taki-Coca: Trade, Traffic, and Organized Peasant Resistance in the Yungas
of La Paz, in COCA, COCAINE, AND THE BOLIVIAN REALITY, supra note 1, at 133-34
(stating that "[N]o one eradicates a coca field in good production. The fields sacri-
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tests, often violent, are becoming commonplace throughout Bo-
livia. 168 On January 14, 2003, Mr. Morales and coca growers
(cocaleros) in the Chapare erected roadblocks, 16 9 one of which
stretched across the country's most traveled highway, demand-
ing an end to coca eradication and Bolivia's withdrawal from the
Bush administration's proposed Free Trade Area of the Ameri-
cas (FTAA).170 Protestors lifted the roadblocks on January 28,
2003 after the Bolivian government agreed to hold talks with
the local cocaleros over the U.S.-backed crackdown on coca
growing. 17 1 Nonetheless, President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada
neither called for a cease-fire, nor withdrew the thousands of
troops patrolling Bolivia's largest highway. 172 During the thir-
teen days of protests, ten civilians and two Bolivian security
force members were killed. 173 According to the Bolivian gov-
ernment, the blockade cost the nation $80 million in lost com-
merce. 17 4
Today, law enforcement issues also generate much conflict
between the Bolivian government and its people. In Bolivia,
drug trafficking organizations are not seen as socially disrup-
tive. 175 Rather, many of its participants come from Bolivia's tra-
ditional elite. Bolivian traffickers, with some exceptions, avoid
violence. 176 Even so, law enforcement efforts tend to target
small producers and buyers, mostly poor young men who are
ficed are either completely choked with weeds and yielding nothing, or 'grandmoth-
ers' with only a scattering of aged plants").
168. See infra notes 169-74 and accompanying text.
169. The Bolivians made the roadblocks using tree trunks and boulders. See
Bolivia Begins Talk with Coca Growers, Media Awareness Project, at http://www.
mapinc.org/drugnews/v03/n134/aOl.html (Jan. 26, 2003).
170. Takefman, supra note 29; see Bolivia Coca Protests End as Government
Agrees to Talks, Reuters Environmental News Network, at http://www.enn.coml
news/2003-01-29/s_2376.asp (Jan. 29, 2003) [hereinafter Bolivia Coca Protests End].
171. Bolivia Coca Protests End, supra note 170, at http://www.enn.com
news/2003-01-29/s_2376.asp (Jan. 29, 2003).
172. Violent Coca Protests Lead to Talks in Bolivia: Soldiers Continue to Patrol
Largest Highway, CNN.com/World, at http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/americas/
01/27/bolivia.talks.ap/ (Jan. 27, 2003) [hereinafter Violent Coca Protests Lead to
Talks].
173. Bolivia Coca Protests End, supra note 170 (noting that since the late 1990s,
some fifty people, mostly farmers, have died in protests responding to anti-coca
campaigns led by trained U.S. soldiers); Police, Farmer Killed in Bolivia Coca
Clashes, Reuters AlertNet at http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N26334255
(Jan. 26, 2003) (noting that at least eighty people were wounded during the road-
blocks).
174. Violent Coca Protests Lead to Talks, supra note 172.
175. L~ons & Sanabria, supra note 1, at 9.
176. Id. at 11.
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drawn to the trade for economic activity, but who often land in
prison. 177 These small producers are easily replaced because of
the lack of economic opportunities in Bolivia and the possibili-
ties of economic success linked to the drug trade.1
78
6. The Failure of Enforcement
There is also a lack of coordination between Bolivian and
U.S. agencies involved in enforcing Bolivia's drug laws. 179 The
presence of U.S. troops in Bolivia enforcing such policies, with-
out the approval of the Bolivian Congress, has angered Bolivi-
ans concerned with maintaining national sovereignty.180 Fur-
thermore, official corruption within Bolivian anti-drug police
forces causes citizen concern.18 ' Political contributions from
drug traffickers to politicians also limit the reach of law en-
forcement efforts in Bolivia.18 2 Young, rural men often protest
against physical abuses by the anti-drug police.18 3  In fact,
throughout Bolivia, most classes of society detest the Bolivian
police force; many people refuse to cooperate with them.184
Thus, the various international, U.S., and Bolivian strate-
gies aimed at coca regulation have ultimately failed. Despite
the huge influx of money, efforts aimed at creating an economi-
cally stable Bolivia free of coca have ended in disaster. Cur-
rently, Bolivia is "awash in international 'aid' of one form or an-
other, and it is certainly not a paradox to suggest that this gush
of capital probably will not result in improving the living stan-
dards of most Bolivians."'18 5 While various agreements have
been reached on different political levels (unilateral, bilateral,
regional, and international), it is most important to understand
the power dynamics played out between the United States and
177. Id. at 12; see Farthing, supra note 147, at 262-63 (noting that most of those
detained are in their twenties, from rural areas, and are uneducated).
178. See L6ons & Sanabria, supra note 1, at 10-12.
179. See Gamarra, supra note 6, at 250-51.
180. Id. at 249.
181. Farthing, supra note 147, at 256-57; see L6ons & Sanabria, supra note 1, at
12 (noting the prevalence of bribes and payoffs throughout the Bolivian police force).
182. L6ons & Sanabria, supra note 1, at 12-13. For instance, in 1980, a "coup of
the coca dollars" brought General Luis Garcia Meza to power. Id. This instigated
the placement of Luis Arce G6mez as Minister of the Interior, who subsequently be-
came known as the Minister of Cocaine. Id. at 13.
183. Farthing, supra note 147, at 264; Zorn, supra note 2, at 79 (finding peas-
ants who reported that UMOPAR officers regularly beat coca growers).
184. Spedding, supra note 167, at 122.
185. L~ons & Sanabria, supra note 1, at 23.
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Bolivia. Throughout all of this, "Bolivia is not able to negotiate
with the U.S. in any way as an equal but can only evade and se-
lectively comply with the demands put on it... in ways reflec-
tive of different national interests as well as profound mutual
misperception and misunderstanding." 18 6 One author proclaims
that, "[t]he promise of alternative development in return for
eradication, but no commitment to its substance, has been proxy
rhetoric for the power imbalance between the U.S. and Bo-
livia ... ."187 In reality, the United States controls Bolivian poli-
tics by providing economic assistance conditioned on the passage
of Bolivian anti-drug laws.188 The relational imbalance between
the two countries suggests that a Bolivian-initiated drug policy,
with only Bolivian interests in mind, might look different, and
might work much better, than the current U.S.-led policies.
189
E. ANTI-U.S. SENTIMENT
Before moving from present realities to potential future al-
ternatives, it is important to note briefly the growing presence of
animosity by Bolivians toward the United States. Much of the
current acrimony comes from the passage of Ley 1008.190 As
mentioned earlier, the Bolivian people responded negatively to
its passage, viewing the law as an attack on national sover-
eignty and economic freedom. 191 Plan Dignidad, initiated in
1998, has also done much to spark anti-U.S. sentiment through-
out Bolivia. 192 For instance, in late January, a new group of In-
dians, the "Army of National Dignity," "made a call to battle se-
curity forces" in defense of coca growing.
193
186. Id. at 28; Farthing, supra note 147, at 269; see also Hallums, supra note 6,
at 862 (stating that "[u]ntil the region and the specific coca producing nations them-
selves determine what their involvement should be, the 'war on drugs' will continue
to be a U.S.-imposed 'war' with a half-hearted regional support framework," and
that "[u]ntil [Bolivia] is able to negotiate freely... and to address the many conflict-
ing elements of its current situation, Bolivia will remain dependent on coca and sub-
ject to international demands").
187. L6ons & Sanabria, supra note 1, at 27; see also Gamarra, supra note 5, at
249.
188. See L6ons & Sanabria, supra note 1, at 23-25.
189. See supra notes 179-88 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 131-39 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 140-47 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 158-62 and accompanying text.
193. Rene Villegas, Bolivia Indian Group Takes up Arms over Coca Plan,
Reuters AlertNet, at http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N22312688 (Jan.
22, 2003). After learning of this group, Evo Morales stated that conditions were in-
appropriate for "armed struggle," and that he would attempt to persuade the group
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This sentiment extends beyond the coca growing commu-
nity. During the January blockades, after police killed a miner,
workers at Bolivia's largest tin mine went on strike for four days
as a show of solidarity with the cocaleros. 194 The pro-coca
movement, led by Evo Morales, has some suggesting that Bo-
livia's government might be forced to repeal its laws eradicating
coca. 195 This expanding rebellion is just the latest signal of
growing resentment toward the United States in Latin Amer-
ica. 196 Morales himself has called the U.S. war on drugs "a[n]
excuse to control our countr[y]. '"197 Cocaleros' anti-U.S. senti-
ment is evident when they speak of the special U.S.-funded Bo-
livian army unit that enforces eradication. 198 In addition, many
Bolivians accuse the United States of lobbying Bolivian officials
to ban Morales from parliament. 199 A cursory examination of
Bolivia's affairs reveals a strong bias against the United States.
II. CRITIQUES AND AN ALTERNATIVE POLICY TO
BOLIVIAN COCA/COCAINE REGULATION
Given recent protests by Bolivians over current drug poli-
cies, and the power dynamics inherent in their development, an
analysis of those policies from a Bolivian perspective is in order.
This Note argues that Bolivia's current policies fail to reflect its
own economic, social, and cultural needs. This section first cri-
tiques current policies found in the various agreements and
laws discussed in Part I, noting major flaws as viewed from a
Bolivian perspective. This section then sets forth an alternative
approach to drug regulation in Bolivia. This approach differs
from current policies primarily because it emphasizes the inter-
ests of the Bolivian people while setting aside the interests of
the United States.
to choose a "peaceful struggle." Id.
194. Bolivia's Huanuni Tin Mine Resumes After Strike, Reuters AlertNet, at
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N22268334 (Jan. 22, 2003).
195. Tim Padgett, Letter from Bolivia: Taking the Side of the Coca Farmer,




198. Id. This special unit has been linked to the deaths of numerous cocalero
leaders. Id.
199. Padgett, supra note 195. In fact, during the 2002 elections, U.S. ambassa-
dor Manuel Rocha openly stated that a Morales victory would signal a drastic reduc-
tion in U.S. economic aid, which amounts to over $150 million a year. This comment
helped Morales become a legitimate presidential candidate. Id.
[Vo1.13:1
THE CASE FOR COCA AND COCAINE
A. PROBLEMS OF THE PAST: FAILED STRATEGIES
Other authors have cogently noted the inefficacy of a U.S.-
imposed war on drugs in Bolivia and other Latin American
countries. 200 While not inherently lacking, this war on drugs
fails primarily because the United States controls the parame-
ters of operation. This can be seen in the many prominent drug




Since 1986, crop eradication has become the primary anti-
cocaine strategy advocated by the United States and adopted by
Bolivia.20 2 Yet, coca eradication ignores the fact that income
from coca exports plays a significant role in the Bolivian econ-
omy.203 The Bolivian economy has indubitably benefited from
cocaine money.20 4 In the 1980s, the cocaine trade's creation of
employment and its multiplier effects 205 served as one of the
most critical factors that cushioned the effect of a Bolivian re-
cession.
206
Because most coca is grown by poor cultivating family
farms, eradication efforts fail to attack the true problems of the
international drug trade, namely the personnel of the cocaine
export pipeline, who go about their business relatively unim-
peded.207 Given the recent plantings of new coca fields, one
must also question the utility of coca eradication as a long-term
solution.208 Eradicating coca causes difficulties because unproc-
essed coca is not illegal. In many parts of Bolivia, coca is crucial
for existence, not just a crop that provides good profits.209 Many
growers believe it is necessary for survival and a prosperous fu-
ture.2 10 Thus, Bolivians often protest eradication efforts as in-
fringing their rights to grow and consume coca, a legal crop.
2 11
200. See supra notes 117-28 and accompanying text.
201. See supra Part I.D.2-4.
202. See supra notes 111-18 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
205. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
208. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 162-66 and accompanying text.
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In the end, Bolivia's farmers view coca eradication as a pol-
icy dictated by the United States to serve U.S. interests, rather
than a policy representing a true expression of Bolivian will.212
This view further undermines the legitimacy of Bolivia's actions
in regulating coca/cocaine in the eyes of its people.213 As a re-
sult, while some might eradicate a portion of their coca crop, Bo-
livians rarely abandon coca altogether, despite the eradication
programs. 214
2. Crop Substitution/Alternative Development
Crop substitution and alternative development strategies
perennially have stood at the vanguard of solutions to Bolivia's
"drug problem."215 In almost every major treaty or piece of legis-
lation passed concerning Bolivian drug regulation, alternative
development is a proposed means of curbing the cocaine
trade. 216 Yet, Bolivian policymakers have continuously recog-
nized the inefficacy of alternative development strategies. 217 As
noted earlier, alternative development is known as a great dis-
aster in much of Bolivia.218
U.S. demands for coca reduction are not aimed at providing
real economic alternatives for coca growers; coca substitution
surfaces only after coca eradication efforts are in place.219 Given
the fact that coca provides a year-round income and full em-
ployment in many families, benefits lacking when growing other
crops, any policy calling for coca substitution, or eradication for
that matter, should be inherently suspect.
220
3. Economic Assistance
Because of the impoverishment of the Bolivian government,
economic assistance has been involved with virtually every piece
of legislation or international agreement focusing on Bolivian
coca. 221 In doing so, the United States has flooded Bolivia with
212. See supra notes 162-99 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 162-99 and accompanying text.
214. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 103, 107-08, 119-25, 150-51, 158-60 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 103, 107-08, 119-25, 150-51, 158-60 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 153-55, 187 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 11-34 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 107-20, 148, 151-52, 159, 185-88 and accompanying text.
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foreign aid that has done little in assisting Bolivia and its eco-
nomic problems. 222 The possibilities for coercion and manipula-
tion from this relationship are numerous. 223 Unfortunately,
those possibilities have become reality in much of the Bolivian-
U.S. relationship. 224 Thus, while unqualified economic assis-
tance is most always beneficial to the recipient, qualified eco-
nomic assistance raises some concerns.
225
Much of this economic assistance goes to promoting neo-
liberal proposals aimed at fostering free and open international
trade.226 Ironically, imposition of controls on the cocaine trade
violates the free market principles that neo-liberalism promotes.
USAID spends an overwhelming amount of aid to support and
enforce coca eradication efforts.227 Large sums of money also go
to development assistance, anti-drug efforts, the Bolivian mili-
tary, and law enforcement agencies.
228
With all of this assistance, no alternative crop has yet been
found that could provide an equivalent return to growing
coca. 229 Thus, while economic assistance pours in, very few, if
any, concrete solutions to Bolivia's economic problems have ma-
terialized.
4. Law Enforcement/Drug Trafficking Interdiction
Since President Bush announced the Andean Strategy in
1989, Bolivia has maintained law enforcement efforts with the
purpose of curbing international drug trafficking. 230 While law
enforcement efforts might well be needed for such purposes,
U.S. influence in this area calls into question the utility of such
policies.
Bolivia's drug trade is much different than the U.S. drug
trade.23 1 Without the concomitant violence associated with the
Bolivian drug trade, one wonders whether the need to suppress
that trade is compelling, or even desirable. The nature of the
222. See supra notes 185-88 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 185-89 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 185-89 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 221-22 and accompanying text.
226. See generally LESLEY GILL, TEETERING ON THE RIM: GLOBAL
RESTRUCTURING, DAILY LIFE, AND THE ARMED RETREAT OF THE BOLIVIAN STATE 1-22
(2000).
227. See supra notes 185-88 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 107-20, 148, 151-52, 159, 185-88 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 43-54 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 148-57 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
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Bolivian trade suggests that Bolivia has much less reason to
suppress drug trafficking than other nations who frown upon
their drug traffickers, especially if one puts aside the moral is-
sues associated with drug production and use.
Moreover, laws targeting drug trafficking have failed be-
cause of the continual entrance of new, savvy traffickers who
are as successful as those groups arrested, prosecuted, and
jailed. 232 As long as these people have the resources and ability
to replenish jailed traffickers, drug trafficking policies will fail.
Because strong foreign demand for drugs remains, their impris-
onment does little to stifle the drug trade.
The presence of the United States in the Bolivian military
and police force also raises serious concerns when addressing
the utility of Bolivian drug laws. 233 It seems rare that a nation's
citizens would willingly obey laws enforced by another country's
police. Official corruption within Bolivian anti-drug police
forces also add to this feeling of hostility, as does police abuse
aimed at Bolivian citizens. 234
All of this suggests that a strategy involving U.S. enforce-
ment of Bolivia's drug laws, as well as U.S.-led Bolivian forces,
leads to a failing policy. To think that Bolivians should essen-
tially obey U.S. laws undermines the basic precepts of national
sovereignty that have defined international relations for centu-
ries. Such thoughts breed revolutions and political turmoil, not
economic, political, and social successes.
5. Agricultural Transition and Economic Reactivation
As two of the four sub-programs of the Narcotic Drugs
Agreement, agricultural transition and economic reactivation
have played meaningful roles in U.S.-led policies to curb Boliv-
ian cocaine production.235 Although this money goes directly to
the Bolivian people, these policies still have major deficiencies.
One major weakness with such strategies is the Bolivian
citizenry's support of coca growing. Coca's symbolic value helps
to explain the reluctance of many Bolivian peasants to eradicate
coca even when offered money to do so. 236  Moreover, the
strength of organized labor in the coca industry has limited the
232. See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 181-84 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
[Vol.13:l
THE CASE FOR COCA AND COCAINE
ability of the Bolivian state to impose terms set forth by interna-
tional demands. 237 Such widespread support, in the face of eco-
nomic assistance to abandon coca, suggests that U.S. economic
aid directly to Bolivian farmers is an ersatz for coca growing.
The enforcement of such programs also demonstrates their
weaknesses. For instance, Bolivian agents often threaten farm-
ers into eradicating their coca crops, and if met with resistance,
the agents forcefully eradicate the crops and withhold pay-
ments. 238 Such "voluntary" eradication conceals an array of re-
pressive and coercive acts. In addition, many who take the
money often live to regret it, especially in the absence of a gov-
ernment-initiated development program.239
6. Regional Development
Regional Development, the third of the four subprograms of
the Narcotic Drugs Agreement, aims to develop infrastructure to
support the regions most affected by crop eradication. 240 This
program, much like economic reactivation, is aimed at providing
a framework for Bolivian peasants so that options exist if those
peasants refrain from growing coca.
Regional development has the potential to succeed. How-
ever, as long as U.S. aid is spent in Bolivia with the purpose of
supporting U.S. interests, such policies will fail to address Boliv-
ian needs. As with any domestic issue, the Bolivian people and
its government know best the infrastructure that might yield fu-
ture profits. While foreigners might study the situation to offer
educated advice, with a vested interest in the outcome, that ad-
vice is inherently suspect. Such infrastructure might, if devel-
oped, work to the disadvantage of U.S. business interests. Yet,
such interests should not factor into an analysis from a Bolivian
perspective. If such things were ignored, a plan of regional de-
velopment, created and implemented by Bolivians, might do
well for the economic vitality of the Bolivian people.
7. Narcotics Awareness and Rehabilitation
The last of the four subprograms from the Narcotic Drugs
Agreement, narcotics awareness and rehabilitation, sets forth a
237. See supra notes 162-66 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
239. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
240. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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public policy against cocaine consumption in Bolivia. While
admirable, it is questionable whether such a policy is needed.
Cocaine use seems to be on the decline in Bolivia.
241
Nevertheless, if the Bolivian government chooses to take a
moral stand against narcotics consumption, it is difficult, espe-
cially today, to object to that stand. At the same time, if the Bo-
livian government chooses neutrality on the drug issue, that de-
cision should be respected as well. The United States should
not force its own morality on other nations, including Bolivia.
Thus, while some drug education is acceptable, forced drug edu-
cation is not.
B. A BRIGHTER FUTURE: BOLIVIA AND UNILATERAL ACTION
Many of the problems associated with the above-mentioned
anti-drug policies do not relate to their moral or practical worth.
It is reasonable to assume that a nation would pass laws
prohibiting or regulating drugs or crops used in producing
drugs. Yet, drug prohibition or regulation is not a necessary
action by any means. While the United States chooses to wage
its war on drugs, it does not follow that Bolivia should do so as
well. In light of the Bolivian reality, coca/cocaine prohibition
has substantial costs that might outweigh any benefits
prohibition fosters.
Nonetheless, at present, the policy initiatives summarized
and critiqued above have failed to provide for Bolivia's inter-
ests.242 These policies have taken profitable opportunities from
Bolivia's farmers and growers without providing economically
viable alternatives to coca. 243 These policies have replaced the
coca/cocaine earnings with U.S. economic aid.244 In essence, Bo-
livia has moved from living independently to something akin to
living on food stamps. It has become a debtor nation by sacrific-
ing its most profitable cash crop, the coca plant. And it has done
this at the urging, indeed the coercion, of the United States.
245
Bolivia would be better off if it precluded the United States
from playing any role in its drug policies. As long as Bolivia is
one of the poorest nations in the western hemisphere and the
United States the richest, the two nations cannot negotiate
241. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
242. See supra Part I.D.3-5.
243. See supra Part I.B.
244. See supra notes 110-26, 134-36, 147-53, 158-60, 185-89.
245. See supra Part I.D.5 and Part I.E.
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freely and equally. 246 As long as this relationship exists, any
agreement between the two undoubtedly inculcates U.S. inter-
ests over Bolivian interests. 247 While the United States has a
drug problem, Bolivia does not.248 Bolivia's citizens do not con-
sume drugs at such high rates as do U.S. citizens. 249 Moreover,
the United States' primary cash crop has not been targeted as
illicit because of a derivative product banned throughout the
world. The two nations stand in remarkably different posi-
tions.250 As such, the two nations are not in any sort of position
to engage in bilateral action on an issue that affects each differ-
ently.
This Note suggests that Bolivia divorce the United States as
a partner in its drug control policies. If done, Bolivia would be
free to regulate coca without fretting over foreign aid the United
States foists upon it. This loss of income undoubtedly has con-
sequences. Yet, other nations might pick up where American
aid leaves off, narrowing some of the gap. Moreover, without in-
tense drug interdiction and enforcement efforts, Bolivia would
save money administratively. And, through liberalization of its
drug laws, particularly with regard to coca, much of the Bolivian
population can return to attainable goals of sustenance without
worrying about violating any of a number of drug laws.
Bolivia might also legalize cocaine as a commodity. While
its export would face severe restrictions, legalization might ac-
tually have the effect of assisting international drug regulation.
In essence, if Bolivian traffickers were forced to procure cocaine
through a legal channel, foreign governments could easily locate
those people attempting to smuggle drugs across borders. If
traffickers were still able to obtain cocaine clandestinely, legali-
zation would most likely have the effect of raising cocaine prices
to pay for the intermediary buying the licit drugs to sell to traf-
fickers engaged in the illegal international drug trade. Ulti-
mately, a comprehensive regulatory cocaine regime would create
employment opportunities in a legal market, while regulations
would keep cocaine from becoming any more dangerous than it
already is in a vast, illegal market. Indeed, the violence associ-
246. L~ons & Sanabria, supra note 1, at 3 (noting, "the Bolivian government is
dependent on bilateral aid from the U.S."); see supra notes 185-89 and accompanying
text.
247. See supra notes 185-89 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 185-89 and accompanying text.
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ated with an illegal drug market would diminish substantially if
the illicit market were converted to a licit market.
In Bolivia's interest, strict coca regulations would cease,
and Bolivians would again be allowed to produce coca to con-
sume and sell on the open market. Confrontations between Bo-
livian drug police and cocaleros would undoubtedly lessen, limit-
ing dissension and saving lives. With the legalization of cocaine,
an illicit market diminishes. The Bolivian government would
then assume the power to regulate cocaine production, distribu-
tion, and consumption within its borders. The country concomi-
tantly would save needed funding that currently goes to eradica-
tion and supply-side reduction efforts that fail to benefit
Bolivia's interests. In the end, Bolivia's citizens would prevail.
CONCLUSION
For centuries, the coca plant has played a prominent role in
the lives of Bolivia's citizens. Within the last century, cocaine, a
derivative of the coca plant, has become a target in the U.S.-led
war on drugs. As a result, the United States perennially has of-
fered economic aid to a cash-strapped Bolivia in exchange for
Bolivia's active participation in the eradication of its coca crops.
Despite its citizens' daily reliance on the coca plant, the Bolivian
government actively assists the United States in its war on
drugs. Such efforts contravene Bolivian interests. Bolivia
should divorce itself from the U.S.-led war on drugs and instead
adopt policies to promote coca growing throughout the country.
Such policies have the potential to provide much needed income,
income other than foreign economic assistance. Through such
policies, Bolivia can begin to climb out of its status as a debtor
nation, free itself from neo-imperialist policies, and act as a sov-
ereign nation.
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